The personnel of the RAP are a diverse group: soldiers, medics and the Padre, as well as evacuation ambulances from 1 Close Support Medical Regiment (CSMR) with young inexperienced crews.
Training during peacetime for the war role has been put sternly to the test during this operation. We were, from the very start, among the furthest forward elements of the Battle Group, often hurtling forward into areas of contact to treat casualties with incoming fire still ongoing. The threat on the battlefield was in all directions, possible NBC casualties weighed heavy on our minds and the reports of enemy targeting the red cross on thinly armoured 432 ambulances with rocket propelled grenades heightened the tension during manoeuvres. I asked my team to record, in their own words, an event which has made an impression on them in the hope that this will provide some insight into the differing roles that make up the front line medical facility of an armoured battle group. We were involved in many fraught situations and their actions were at all times exemplary.
It was clear that all evacuation from the front line would be by armour and wheels, not helicopters as had been originally suggested. Anti tank mines lay by the sides of the roads and made two-directional traffic a constant challenge. In a change to the med plan enforced by circumstance, the pattern emerged that the RAP would be called forward to wherever there were casualties, to treat on site and prove the route for evacuation. This was only sustainable as the actual volume of casualties at any one time was low and the armoured medical section (AMS) from 1 CSMR were in reserve further to the rear.
On the first morning after the war started we were in a farm complex waiting to be called across the border. The two teenage civilian girls had, it transpired, been hit by a helicopter gunship strike. One had severe blast injuries to the medial aspect of her right leg extending up to her pelvic area, she was becoming less responsive and more shut down. We tasked one of the warrior vehicles to request helivac and proceeded to stabilize the girls as best we could. 15 family members and locals, who were understandably anxious, surrounded them. The second girl had a traumatic amputation of her left hand and some fingers from her right hand were missing. She had also sustained an open femoral fracture, which had been splinted by the Sqn Medic. When the helicopter arrived they were surprised to find that the casualties were civilian, we insisted they take them as there was no time for lengthy discussion. I had no idea where they were going and took what details I could from the locals, in Arabic, in the hope that someone, somewhere may be able to find them and get them back to their families once treated. I have heard nothing of them since. The casualty had passed out and vomited whilst wearing his respirator. Having been told that they had been gassed, someone had administered a combopen of atropine, pralidoxime and diazepam, the medic on scene administered a second combopen and brought him back to our location. The double dose of diazepam did little to help him come round but hindsight was unavailable at the time. A BM of 1 showed the way and he improved dramatically with the IV glucose, he recovered in hospital for a couple of days before returning to duty. The NBC threat was real enough to everybody at the time to keep us on edge.
As the Battle Group consolidated on their respective bridges to the west of Basra, HQ moved up into the Airport. We moved down to the 'cloverleaf' 1500 metres from bridge 2, a site that was being intermittently mortared as, alternately, warriors then challenger 2s probed forward to harass the enemy. It was not long before the first of the two lowest points came for the Battle Group and us. Our aim in the RAP is to assess, stabilize and package casualties for speedy evacuation, there is no time for a complete investigation of all possible injuries so I do not know the true extent of these boys' wounds. I hope they are doing well. The waste of some lives and the ruination of others through blue on blue incidents is difficult to deal with.The fog of war obscures the complete picture of what happened. Those on the ground find out only by piecemeal and by rumour the circumstances involved. All the procedures and equipment are in place to prevent it happening but it still occurs. There is no solace.
We returned to the bridge and began to alternate roles with the AMS. The heat, flies and tedium of waiting for days on end at the more frontline bridge position was gratefully interspersed with a couple of days of washing clothes, playing cards, admin and sick parades in the airport. On Sunday 6th April, I attended the morning briefing and we were given our H hour to move into Basra itself. We were once again in convoy with Y Coy on the way in, when we had reports of a casualty in severe difficulties further forward. We moved as fast as possible up to his location. We completed the move to our Battle Group objectives, it seemed a hollow victory at already too great a cost to all. But casualties continued and we, like the rest of the Battle Group, carried on. Intermittent firefights between looters and occasionally with our forces injured more. There is little more soul destroying for me or my medics than seeing injuries where we can do nothing, being on scene so quickly increases the likelihood of this occurring. She had been shot through the head and was clearly a P4 hold casualty, meaning that she had sustained an unsurvivable injury but was not yet dead. We took her to the local hospital in one ambulance and took her children in another. There had been a firefight involving grenades and a shack was on fire next to theirs so they could not stay there.There was a large crowd at the casualty department, who were very matter of fact about the whole thing and took the children away, thanking us for bringing them. I didn't feel we deserved their thanks. We had taken over part of a hotel as the RAP and were based there with an evac ambulance as the RPG threat was still present. Efforts were ongoing to fortify the location and to prevent the looting from cascading any further out of control. In addition to this a wave of gastro-intestinal upset was spreading through the unit, putting people out of action for 24 hr periods, which had to be spent close to the latrines.
Occasional casualties were being evacuated to the DS 1a or 34 Fd Hospital during which the following incident occurred. 
